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Abstract 
Institutional statism: an overview of the formulation of the taxi 
recapitalisation policy  
This article provides an overview of the government’s formula-
tion of the taxi recapitalisation policy which is aimed at regu-
lating the minibus taxi industry. Coupled with a brief social and 
politico-historical context of the policy, the aim is to highlight the 
government’s statist conduct in the formulation of the recapi-
talisation policy. The minibus taxi industry started to fulfil a pro-
minent role in the 1970s as a result of a loophole in the 
legislation of the former apartheid government. It is currently the 
most accessible mode of public transport and conveys 65 per 
cent of the country’s commuters daily. Consequently, the Indus-
try is an imperative force to be considered by the government in 
its formulation of transport policies. However, the industry is 
characterised by numerous problems, including a high rate of 
minibus taxis involved in accidents, unroadworthy vehicles and 
violence. It is in this context that the government formulated 
both the original and revised versions of the recapitalisation 
policy. However, the formulation of the policy has been proble-
matic. The government followed a statist approach during the 
formulation process when it directed the course of the process 
according to its interests and without adequate consultation with 
relevant role players.  
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Opsomming 
Institusialisme: ’n oorsig van die formulering van die 
taxiherkapitaliseringsbeleid  
Hierdie artikel verskaf ’n oorsig hoe die Suid-Afrikaanse rege-
ring die taxiherkapitaliseringsbeleid geformuleer het. Die rege-
ring beoog om met behulp van die herkapitaliseringsbeleid die 
land se minibus taxibedryf te reguleer. Die doel van die artikel is 
om, tesame met ’n kort oorsig van die sosiale en polities-his-
toriese konteks van die beleid, te beklemtoon hoe die regering 
’n sogenaamde benadering van institusialisme tydens die for-
mulering van die herkapitaliseringsbeleid gevolg het. Die mini-
bus taxibedryf vervul sedert die sewentigerjare ’n belangrike rol 
as gevolg van ’n skuiwergat in die wetgewing van die voor-
malige apartheidsregering. Dit is tans die toeganklikste vorm 
van openbare vervoer met 65 persent van die land se pen-
delaars wat verkies om met minibus taxi’s te pendel. Dit is dus 
belangrik dat die regering die bedryf in ag neem indien beleide 
gerig op die openbare vervoerstelsel geformuleer word. Die 
bedryf word egter deur verskeie probleme in die gesig gestaar. 
Probleme sluit onder andere ’n hoë ongeluksyfer, onpadwaar-
dige voertuie en geweld in. Die regering het, in ’n poging om 
hierdie probleme in die bedryf te hanteer, sowel die oorspronk-
like en hersiene weergawes van die herkapitaliseringsbeleid 
geformuleer. Hierdie formuleringsproses het egter nie sonder 
probleme verloop nie aangesien die regering ’n tipiese bena-
dering van institutialisme gevolg het. Die regering het byvoor-
beeld sy eie belange voorop gestel en versuim om die relevante 
rolspelers by die proses te betrek of voldoende te raadpleeg. 
1. Introduction 
One of the underlying assumptions of the policymaking process is 
the promotion of the general welfare and conditions of society as a 
whole, or at least a certain sector within that society. Policy theorists 
such as Anderson (2006) refers to the process as a definite plan of 
action; a plan of action that the government of the day enforces in 
order to ascertain a way to allocate scarce resources to improve the 
circumstances of its constituency. The formulation stage forms part 
of this policymaking process. When an issue in society is regarded 
as a policy problem and attains policy agenda status, the govern-
ment reacts by formulating a policy response to attend to the per-
ceived policy problem.1 The question that guides this article is to 
                                      
1 For Anderson (2006:82) a policy problem is a condition or situation that 
produces needs and dissatisfaction on the part of people for which relief or 
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what extent did the government exemplified statist conduct in its 
formulation of the taxi recapitalisation policy by utilising institutional 
statism as a theoretical framework.2 The aim is to emphasise that 
inadequate consultation with the public relating to various aspects of 
a specific policy could threaten the potential success of such a po-
licy, making the policymaking process, and more specifically the for-
mulation stage, a futile exercise.3 The first part of the article draws 
attention to the rationale for using institutional statism to analyse the 
formulation of the recapitalisation policy by providing the theoretical 
framework that anchors this article. In the second part the article 
provides the social and politico-historical context of the recapita-
lisation policy by providing a brief historical development of the 
South African minibus taxi industry. The former justifies why the 
government decided to formulate the recapitalisation policy. The fi-
nal section focuses on specific examples highlighting some of the 
instances where the government explicitly demonstrated a statist ap-
proach in the formulation of the recapitalisation policy. This is done 
in the light of the theoretical underpinnings as developed in the first 
part. 
2. Background and rationale for institutional statism 
theory 
Before turning to a discussion of the institutional statism theory in 
relation to the themes of this article, it is necessary to pay attention 
to the role and functions of political (i.e. public policy) institutions. 
Institutions are the arena within which the policymaking process 
occurs, as they process inputs from society and turn them into out-
puts (public policies). John (2000:38) notes that institutions define 
how a political system operates. Likewise, Dye (2005:12) argues 
that the relationship between public policy and government insti-
tutions is very close since a policy does not becomes a public policy 
until it has passed through the policymaking process stages, which 
                                                                                                             
redress is sought. The government is generally responsible for the facilitation of 
the so-called relief or redress.  
2 Institutional statism is commonly referred to as the institutional approach or just 
statism. 
3 According to John (2000:204), formulation is normally viewed as the most 
critical step in the policymaking process since such a policy presumably attends 
to the interests, needs and demands of society, coupled with that of the 
government. Therefore, everyone is constantly influenced by the policies of the 
government as it has important consequences for the whole of society. 
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is enforced by some government institutions (e.g. legislature, exe-
cutive). De Coning and Cloete (2006:39) support this notion when 
they state that the premise of the institutional statism approach is 
that the policymaking process is the product of public institutions, 
which are responsible for its formulation. 
Institutional statism is a theoretical confluence of some elements of 
elite and public choice theory (March & Olsen, 1997:139). As a 
variant of elite theory, it acknowledges that elites may assemble in 
the institutions of the government, influencing the policymaking pro-
cess in accordance with their particular needs and interests. As the 
government is the core arena where public policy is formulated – 
and where politics happens – it, together with its policy institutions, 
becomes a determinant of policy formulation. In this way, the 
government turns out to be dominant in political life. This domination 
is illustrated in the government feeding policy inputs and prescrip-
tions to sections of society (elites), who in turn reinforces the state’s 
legitimacy (public choice) and capacity to react to those problems 
via the policymaking process. 
By directing the course of the policymaking process, government in-
stitutions provide public policies with three distinctive characteristics 
(Dye, 2005:12). Firstly, they afford legitimacy to policies, projecting 
legal obligations into the policies that are made. Government 
policies (e.g. the recapitalisation policy) command the loyalty of the 
country’s citizens (e.g. roleplayers in the minibus taxi industry) and 
are generally regarded as legally binding on citizens. For instance, 
although people may view the policies of other groups in society – 
churches, schools and so forth – as important and even binding, 
these policies do not, as with government policies, involve legal 
obligations. For example, government’s legislation on common law 
issues such as theft states that one could go to jail for stealing, and 
is thus legally binding. On the other hand, a school’s policy might 
state that one should not be late, but the punctuality policy is not 
legally binding on all of society. 
Secondly, the policies of government are universal. As a result, 
these public policies are applicable to all citizens. In contrast to this, 
the policies of other groups only reach a part within society. For 
example, the legislation on theft is binding on all citizens, whereas 
the no late-coming to school policy is only applicable to the learners 
of a specific school. Thirdly, the government monopolises coercion 
in society. In the public policy domain this means that the govern-
ment is the only institution that can legitimately sanction violators of 
its public policies. The sanctions that can be imposed by other 
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groups in society are more limited: for example, one would most 
probably only be summoned to do detention if one arrives late at 
school, while one could go to jail for theft. 
Lastly, any discussion on the policymaking process and a particular 
theoretical discourse being utilised to analyse this process, should 
consider the policy environment. The reason for this is that a policy 
such as the recapitalisation policy does not transpire within a va-
cuum, but within a specific, often highly dynamic, policy environ-
ment. Therefore, the government and its policyformulators are 
greatly influenced by this environment since it generates the actions 
that they can take (Hill, 1980:103; Palumbo & Calista, 1990:5; and 
Anderson, 2006:39). Policyformulators thus need to consider the 
policy environment and bear in mind important environmental factors 
such as the socio-economic conditions of the target population of a 
particular policy. In an attempt to grasp the features of the policy 
environment, policyformulators need to take into account the input 
from various policy entrepreneurs in society.4 To put it differently, all 
role players have to bargain during the process and the target 
population is one of these role players. Authors such as Larsen, 
Taylor-Gooby and Kananen (2006:631) underline this when they 
comment that the government should “... ensure that all affected 
groups are consulted, and, secondly, actively engage [them] in the 
formulation of a policy”.  
3. Social and politico-historical context of the taxi 
recapitalisation policy  
The context from which the need as well as the reaction to a specific 
policy originates is often referred to as the policy environment. As 
mentioned above, the formulation of a policy such as the recapi-
talisation policy does not occur in a political or social vacuum. 
Therefore, it is the aim of this section to provide a brief social and 
politico-historical context from which the recapitalisation policy 
evolved (i.e. the policy environment) in terms of a brief overview of 
the development of the industry. 
                                      
4 Citizens, government agency officials, representatives of interest groups and so 
forth, who through effort, persistence, and/or expenditure of resources promote 
action on public policy issues, are often referred to as policyentrepreneurs 
(John, 2000:204; Theodoulo & Kofinis, 2004:137; and Anderson, 2006:92, 316). 
Often these entrepreneurs in fact identify policyproblems, determine what 
should be discussed during policydebates and gather support for specific 
policyproposals. 
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The industry was conceived during the 1970s based on a loophole 
in the Road Transportation Act of 1977 of the former apartheid 
government’s transport legislation. The loophole in this Act was that 
it did not define – or, indeed, even mention – the word taxi. It re-
ferred only to buses and cars.5 This made it possible for minibus 
taxis to redefine their capacity to nine passengers, including the 
driver.6 Therefore, minibuses could avoid the regulations applicable 
to both buses and cars by leaving a number of seats empty, carrying 
only eight passengers. By following this approach, they were, strictly 
speaking, not operating as either a car (less than eight), sedan taxi 
(four plus one) or a bus (more than eight), and could not therefore 
be judged in those terms. Since then, despite regulation and deregu-
lation attempts by both the apartheid (1977-1994) and democratic 
governments (1994-current) the industry has grew into the most 
accessible mode of public transport in the country and proved to be 
an essential segment of the country’s urban transport sector.  
It is estimated that 38% of the total South African population are 
dependent on public transport on a daily basis, and that the majority 
of the working population (65%) use minibus taxis. In comparison, 
only 21% use buses, while 14% use trains. In addition, the National 
Household Transport Survey of 2003 found that 75,7% and 37,7% of 
South African citizens do not have access to train and bus services 
respectively. In contrast to this, only 8,6% of the citizens indicated 
that they do not have access to a minibus taxi service (SADT, 
2007a). Furthermore, South African workers walk approximately 
seventeen minutes to a train station, nine minutes to a bus stop and 
eight minutes to a minibus loading place. In its development of a 
national scholar transport policy the Department of Transport 
(SADT, 2007b:6) also found that the highest proportion of trips to 
school by public transport are made by minibus taxi. It is therefore 
evident that South Africans have easier access to minibus taxi 
services in comparison with any other form of public transport.  
Despite the above, the industry, with its most prominent role players 
being the taxi owners, taxi drivers, taxi associations, vehicle clea-
ners, fare collectors and taxi rank marshals, does not receive an 
                                      
5 A bus was defined as a vehicle that could transport more than eight passengers, 
while a car was described as a vehicle carrying up to eight passengers (SADT, 
1977:5-6). 
6 This phenomenon of minibus taxis carrying eight passengers plus the driver 
soon became commonly known as the “8+1” vehicle. 
D. van Schalkwyk 
Koers 73(4) 2008:771-791  777 
official subsidy from the government. Also, the industry has since its 
inception been characterised by perceived problems, including a 
high rate of minibus taxis involved in accidents, coupled with un-
roadworthy vehicles and violence. In an effort to establish sus-
tainable solutions to these perceived problems, the government 
created the National Taxi Task Team with the co-operation of role 
players within the industry. The Task Team was responsible for 
investigating the issues and problems in the industry and providing 
solutions. After 36 public hearings throughout South Africa between 
August 1995 and January 1996, the Task Team submitted a 300-
page final report to the minister of transport (National Taxi Task 
Team, 1996:6; Dugard, 2001:144; and Barrett, 2003:14).  
The concept of the recapitalisation of the South African minibus taxi 
industry can be traced back to the third recommendation of the 
above-mentioned Task Team. This recommendation encourages the 
implementation of policies (i.e. the recapitalisation policy) that would 
empower the minibus taxi industry economically and formalise it 
(National Taxi Task Team, 1996:114). Other recommendations in-
cluded the regulation and enhanced control of the industry by esta-
blishing a National Minibus Taxi Association as well as the establish-
ment of minimum labour standards (National Taxi Task Team, 
1996:59, 103). It is in this context that the government announced 
the original taxi recapitalisation policy in 1999, which was replaced 
by the revised version of the policy in 2004.  
4. Elements/aspects of the taxi recapitalisation policy  
The government accepted the recommendations of the National 
Taxi Task Team in 1998 and announced the original recapitalisation 
policy (with a R4,4 billion budget) in September 1999 but after some 
financial and operational concerns, it announced the revised recapi-
talisation policy (with a R7,7 billion budget) in November 2004. The 
most significant legislation concerning the recapitalisation policy in-
cludes the National Land Transport Transition Act of 2000, the 
National Land Transport Transition Amendment Act of 2006 and the 
National Land Transport Bill of 2008. In these legislations the recapi-
talisation policy is described as an attempt to formalise, regulate, 
and economically empower the South African minibus taxi industry 
through the replacement of the country’s current minibus taxi fleet 
with newer, bigger and safer vehicles. In addition, owners will re-
ceive a scrapping allowance (i.e. R50 000) as a refund when they 
submit their old minibus taxis, which they can utilise to purchase a 
new minibus taxi or to exit the industry (SA, 2000:44; Parliamentary 
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Monitoring Group, 2000; SA, 2006:16; SADT, 2008:5, 15; and SA, 
2008:44). Both the original and revised recapitalisation policies were 
also designed to attend to the above-mentioned perceived problems 
in the South African minibus taxi industry. 
In its formulation of the recapitalisation policy the government has 
set various goals.7 According to its taxi recapitalisation policy docu-
ment, the Department of Transport (SADT, 2008:5) lists these goals 
as follows:  
• The minibus taxi industry will move into the formal political eco-
nomy by paying taxes on their income. 
• The establishment of minibus taxi co-operatives will assist ope-
rators to purchase both vehicle parts and diesel at lower prices. 
• The working conditions of everyone involved in the minibus taxi 
industry will improve. 
• The proposed vehicles will be safer, more reliable and com-
fortable for both the drivers and commuters. 
• The operating patterns of the new taxi vehicle (NTV) will be more 
easily accessible as well as controllable. 
• Black economic empowerment will be encouraged. 
• Taxi wars, especially for the right to use lucrative routes and 
minibus taxi ranks, will be halted. 
• The largest part of South Africa’s urban transport system will be 
revitalised. 
In addition, the following are according to the taxi recapitalisation po-
licy document of the Department of Transport (SADT, 2008:5) the 
objectives8 of the recapitalisation policy: 
• Effective black economic empowerment of the minibus taxi in-
dustry through the establishment of minibus taxi co-operatives 
                                      
7 According to Roux (2006:128) a goal is “an unrealised state not yet achieved by 
the members of an organisation but which they regard as desirable”. 
8 An objective is described by Roux (2006:128) as “a short term goal that can be 
deducted from an organisation’s mission and that could be stated by means of a 
process of negotiation”. 
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• The introduction of a once-off scrapping allowance of R50 000 
per scrapped vehicle to legal operators with registered minibus 
taxi vehicles 
• Effective law enforcement in the minibus taxi industry 
• The introduction of new vehicles with specific safety speci-
fications 
• Sustainable formalisation, regulation and registration of the mini-
bus taxi industry in order to prepare the industry adequately for 
the implementation of the policy 
The official target population of the recapitalisation policy is the taxi 
owners, while the official role players are the following: 
• National governmental departments coupled with their provincial 
counterparts, including the Departments of Transport, Trade and 
Industry, Minerals and Energy, Environmental Affairs and Tour-
ism, Labour, and Finance 
• The South African National Standards, previously known as the 
South African Bureau for Standards 
• The motor industry 
• The South African National Taxi Council (Santaco)9 (SADT, 
2008:22-25.) 
5. Institutional statism and the formulation of the taxi 
recapitalisation policy  
5.1 Identifying the target population and problem in the 
minibus taxi industry 
As mentioned above the taxi owners were identified as the official 
target population of the recapitalisation policy by the government. 
                                      
9 The government has always only acknowledged one national minibus taxi 
association (i.e. Santaco, 2004) as an official role player in the recapitalisation 
policy. Relating to the original version of the policy, the government commented, 
“Government continues to recognise only, Santaco as the only [role] player in 
the [minibus taxi] industry” (Mabuza, 2003:2). As regards the revised recapi-
talisation policy, in the words of Montana (2005): “We talk to everyone [in the 
minibus taxi industry]. The provincial ministers of transport consulted with every-
one in all the provinces. However, Santaco is the ultimate and legitimate voice 
of the [South African minibus] taxi industry”.  
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The government did this without consulting the industry, making the 
process a flawed one. Identifying only the taxi owners as the official 
target population of the recapitalisation policy is testament to the 
short-sightedness of the government in the formulation of the recapi-
talisation policy. This article argues that other relevant role players in 
the South African minibus taxi industry – such as taxi drivers, vehicle 
washers, fare collectors, rank marshals – should all be included in 
the official target population of the recapitalisation policy, since the 
policy has the potential to influence the socio-economic circum-
stances of all these role players, not only the official target group 
(i.e. taxi owners). 
Ideally, the policymaking process for policies (e.g. the recapitalisa-
tion policy) should start with the identification of a policyproblem. 
The implication is that a particular issue is regarded as a public 
problem and needs to be dealt with. Such a phenomenon is thus 
viewed as unacceptable and therefore appropriate for the govern-
ment to act on. To quote Fourie (2004:11): “If there were nothing to 
solve, policy responses would not be necessary.” For example, if the 
South African government were not convinced that there is a pro-
blem within the minibus taxi industry, a policy response such as the 
recapitalisation policy would not have been initiated in the first place. 
The government thus identified a policyproblem and decided to react 
(i.e. a policyresponse). Often in democratic societies such as South 
Africa a policyproblem is also identified and/or emerges from civil 
society who then request the government to formulate a policy in 
accordance with how they see the problem (Dye, 2005:31). How-
ever, this was not the case in terms of the recapitalisation policy. 
From the beginning there has been an ambivalent recognition of the 
policyproblem between the government and the minibus taxi in-
dustry. Certain issues relating to the industry are interpreted in no-
ticeably different ways by the government as opposed to the 
industry’s role players.  
With regard to the accident rate and unroadworthy vehicles, the 
industry never saw a problem and consequently did not demand a 
policyresponse from the government. Therefore, there was a dif-
ference in the identification of the problem as well as an absence of 
mutual recognition.10 For example, in a document presented to the 
                                      
10 Parsons (1997:87) observes that the public policymaking process should entails 
the mutual recognition of a problem as a policyproblem.  
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government to raise their concerns with the original recapitalisation 
policy, Top Six (2000:4) and its members argued that “... the coun-
try’s current fleet of minibus taxis are safe and not un-roadworthy as 
government suggest and it therefore cannot be blamed for accidents 
on the country’s roads”. In addition, three years later, Top Six were 
persisting with this view, noting, “We are happy with the present fleet 
of vehicles” (Khangale, 2003:2). Also, a month before the official 
launch of the implementation of the revised TRP in October 2006, 
Santaco, the KwaZulu-Natal Transport Alliance, and the Western 
Cape Taxi Association “pointed out that government’s claim that the 
taxi fleets were all either ageing or un-roadworthy was misleading”. 
These organisations made this point at a presentation on the 
recapitalisation policy before the government’s Transport Portfolio 
Committee (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2006). 
However, on the other hand, the industry also recognises the preva-
lence of violence as a problem in the South African minibus taxi 
industry. For instance, and as mentioned above, minibus taxi vio-
lence was one of the reasons why the industry together with the 
government established the National Taxi Task Team in 1995 as it 
acknowledged that violence is a problem, which needed investiga-
tion and a solution (National Taxi Task Team, 1996:12 and Molele-
kwa, 2008).11 
The above lack of mutual recognition of the policyproblem relates to 
one of the difficulties during the policyprocess: what is perceived as 
a problem by one person might not be regarded as a problem by 
another (Anderson, 2006:83). In addition, it implies that policyissues 
such as accidents, unroadworthy vehicles and minibus taxi violence 
do not just happen and are often “in the eye of the beholder”. The 
identification of the policyproblem within the minibus taxi industry 
was thus contingent on who perceived an issue as a problem, when 
did they decide this and consequently how the problem was defined. 
Despite the lack of complete consensus at the policyproblem 
identification stage, the government in true statist fashion proceeded 
with the recapitalisation policyprocess.  
                                      
11 Molelekwa is the head of communications at Santaco. 
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5.2 Forwarding the minibus taxi problems onto the 
policyagenda 
Following the identification of the policyproblem, the government 
should forward this perceived problem onto the policyagenda. 
However, not all policyproblems make it onto the policyagenda. To 
get onto the policyagenda, a problem must be converted into an 
issue that the government actually responds to (Starling, 1988:13; 
Dunn, 2004:45; and Fourie, 2004:12). Keeping this in mind, policy-
agenda setting can be defined as the different ways policyproblems 
can get onto the policyagenda, thus receiving the necessary and 
adequate attention of the policymakers. Sharskansky (2002:19-20) 
and Fox and Bayat (2006:53) for their part refer simply to policy-
agenda setting as the activity that places public policyproblems on 
the public policymaking agenda. Furthermore, to have a chance to 
be acted upon, a problem should be moved to the institutional po-
licyagenda where policyproblems receive formal attention by the 
government (Anderson, 2006:87-88). It refers to government action 
in the form of resources, legislation and time-frames. The recapi-
talisation policy fits into institutional policyagenda setting as it 
requires resources (e.g. financial, human, and logistical), legislation 
(see above) and the constant attention of the government. It also 
has specific time-frames (i.e. 2005-2012) for its ultimate imple-
mentation, as pre-determined by the government. 
Different role players are involved in the process of forwarding a 
policyproblem onto the policyagenda. Parsons (1997:128-129), 
Theodoulou and Kofinis (2004:69-73) and Booysen (2006:737-739) 
observe that policy agenda setting is facilitated by large sections of 
society, including the mass media, lobbyists and other interest 
groups as well as the Head of State (i.e. the president in South 
Africa’s case). In addition, individual members of parliament, agency 
representatives and citizens who forward policyproblems onto the 
policyagenda also act as so-called policyentrepreneurs in the po-
licyagenda setting process (Dye, 2005:40). As regards the TRP, 
however, it must be noted that, as the relevant role players in the 
minibus taxi industry never officially acknowledged that a problem 
exists in terms of accidents and unroadworthy vehicles (see above), 
their demands did not play a significant role in forwarding these 
problems onto the policyagenda as they did not establish the items 
on the policyagenda since they did not bring it into the policyrealm in 
the first place. This latter again highlights the statist conduct of the 
government in the recapitalisation policyprocess. 
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On the other hand, agreeing that minibus taxi violence is indeed a 
problem did not imply that these role players participated in pushing 
it onto the policyagenda. To the contrary, a number of these role 
players (e.g. Top Six) have complained that they have not been 
included in the recapitalisation policyprocess (Headbush, 1999:7). 
Therefore, it is clear that when the government identified partially by 
itself what the problem was and proceeded with the recapitalisation 
policyprocess, it was, in line with the government’s statist approach, 
a foregone conclusion that this problem would reach the govern-
ment’s policyagenda.  
In an attempt to prevent a problem from attaining agenda status 
societal role players (e.g. those within the minibus taxi industry) may 
utilise a range of strategies. It is important to note that individuals or 
groups (e.g. role players within the minibus taxi industry) within so-
ciety preventing certain policyproblems from attaining agenda status 
could also influence the policyagenda. These so-called anti-agenda 
setters may utilise a range of strategies to prevent a problem from 
reaching the policyagenda. These strategies may include a denial by 
anti-agenda setters that a problem exists and they might reason that 
the perceived policyproblem is inappropriate for government action 
and could be adequately dealt with by non-governmental means 
(Anderson, 2006:95-96). As regards the recapitalisation policy, role 
players (e.g. taxi associations, owners, and drivers) attempted in va-
rious ways to prevent the problem as identified by the government 
from reaching the policyagenda. For instance, bearing in mind the 
issue of unroadworthy vehicles and accidents as policyproblems, the 
role players in the minibus taxi industry protested that there was no 
problem with their vehicles. Therefore, they argued that they do not 
need, want or require the government’s intervention – the recapita-
lisation policy (Raboroko, 1999:3; Headbush, 1999:7; Sebolao, 
1999:1; and Anon., 1999:9).  
The industry also argued that it was improper for the government to 
respond to the perceived policyproblem. These problems, they be-
lieved, could be addressed successfully by non-governmental en-
tities (i.e. themselves). They were convinced that if a (policy) pro-
blem does exist, that only they are competent to address such a 
problem, as they presumably understand the industry best and 
consequently know best what the industry needs. Employing these 
tactics, the role players in the South African minibus taxi industry 
aimed to ensure that the problem as identified by the government 
lost its agenda status and consequently left the policyarena. 
However, notwithstanding all these attempts the government went 
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on to pursue the recapitalisation policy. The problem therefore did 
not lose its agenda status. This again exemplifies the government’s 
statist approach as it highlights the one-sided preservation of the 
agenda status of the perceived policyproblem within the minibus taxi 
industry. 
5.3 Formulating the taxi recapitalisation policy  
Subsequent to both identifying the policyproblem and forwarding it 
onto the policyagenda, the government proceeded to formulate the 
recapitalisation policy. As stated above, the government first for-
mulated the original recapitalisation policy in 1999, followed by the 
revised version of the policy in 2004 together with various official 
role players (i.e. government departments, Santaco, and the motor 
industry).  
In addition to the government, the public should also have the op-
portunity to be part of the policyformulation process. The South 
African Constitution stipulates in section 195 (1e), “the public must 
be encouraged to participate in policy-making” and the general 
principle is that this is facilitated through public hearings. However, 
in the formulation of both the original and revised recapitalisation 
policy no public hearings to ensure public participation have been 
held. This was confirmed by the Gauteng Deputy Director for 
Special Projects (Steeneveldt, 2008):  
There were no official public hearings specifically for the 
recapitalisation policy. What we did have was meetings with the 
leadership of Santaco. The idea was that they should go back 
to their members and inform them. One should admit that the 
government should have approached this differently because 
this is the reason why the taxi owners, drivers, taxi washers and 
taxi rank marshals are still ill-informed about the recapitalisation 
policy. To sum it up; we have communicated, but not enough. 
Meaning we did involve the taxi leadership, which is good, but 
we should have also involved the afore-mentioned role 
players.12   
                                      
12 Interactions with four other respondents supported this observation, including 
the Director for Policy and Research at the Gauteng Department of Transport, 
Modise (2008) who noted, “I am not aware of any public hearings [for the 
recapitalisation policy]”, and the head of communications at Santaco (Mole-
lekwa, 2008). The other two respondents are high ranking officials at the 
National Department of Transport in Pretoria and requested that their identity 
and work designation remain anonymous, also refusing the usage of 
pseudonyms (They are referred to as Donna and Ethel (Anon., 2008a; 2008b) in 
D. van Schalkwyk 
Koers 73(4) 2008:771-791  785 
The above clearly typifies the statist approach of the government in 
its formulation of the recapitalisation policy, as it failed to consider 
the interests and needs of the official (i.e. taxi owners) and/or un-
official role players (i.e. taxi drivers, vehicle cleaners, rank marshals, 
fare collectors, and commuters) of the recapitalisation policy, which 
were identified earlier. When the government official (Steeneveldt) 
mentions role players he is clearly only speaking about the govern-
ment and Santaco (which was established with the assistance of the 
government), to the exclusion of all the relevant role players in the 
South African minibus taxi industry. This illustrates the marginali-
sation of these relevant role players and therefore the statist nature 
of the formulation of the recapitalisation policy because the 
government failed to provide a platform (i.e. public hearings) for their 
concerns during this process.  
Another example of how the government acted on its own surfaces if 
one focuses, for example, on the formulation of the revised recapi-
talisation policy. On the day that the government officially an-
nounced the revised recapitalisation policy in November 2004, 
Santaco (the self-chosen ally of the government) said, “Santaco do 
not know the contents of the memorandum [on the recapitalisation 
policy] but expected an announcement soon” (quoted in Cokayne, 
2004:1). In fact, Santaco, and the rest of the minibus taxi industry for 
that matter, was unaware of a revision of the recapitalisation policy. 
For instance, in the same aforementioned source the deputy 
director-general of transport notes, “they [the government] would not 
disclose the content of the memorandum as it was private to cabinet 
...”  Stating that the information, which clearly entailed specifications 
on the then unknown revised recapitalisation policy, “was private to 
cabinet” clearly typifies an assembling of elites, which in turn 
underlines a statist approach in the formulation of the revised recapi-
talisation policy.  
In relation to the proposed new taxi vehicles, the original re-
capitalisation policy stipulated that the new taxis should use diesel. 
The mandatory use of diesel in the new taxis evoked reactions from 
the minibus taxi industry. For instance, Top Six and Santaco argued 
that the diesel stipulation would increase the maintenance cost of 
the new taxis because diesel is more expensive than petrol (Mis-
bach, 1999:2; Yeld, 1999:12; Hlengani, 2005:44; and Nzapheza, 
                                                                                                             
the list of references). The former suggests that these officials are aware that 
the government did not follow the proper channels in its formulation of the 
recapitalisation policy. 
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2005:2). However, despite these objections to the diesel stipulation 
in the original recapitalisation policy, the government in its for-
mulation of the revised version of the policy exemplified a statist ap-
proach and single-handedly decided that diesel should still be com-
pulsory for the new taxis. This demonstrates a complete incon-
sideration of the needs, demands and financial sustainability of the 
target population. 
All the above-mentioned flaws identified in the formulation process 
of the recapitalisation policy reflect a discrepancy between the ap-
proach (i.e. institutional statist conduct) of the government, on the 
one hand, and the needs (e.g. socio-economic needs) of both the 
official and unofficial target population of the policy, on the other 
hand. As noted earlier, all policies transpire within a policy 
environment and the government is greatly influenced by this 
environment since it limits as well as directs what they can or cannot 
do. Clearly indicative of its statist tactics, the government did not 
always take into consideration the socio-economic environment in its 
formulation of especially the original recapitalisation policy. For 
instance, as regards the specifications for the door of the original 
recapitalised new taxis, the government had specified that the door 
should be an electronic door (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 
2004b). Insisting that these vehicles should have an electronic door 
indicates that the government had lost sight of the fact that having 
an electronic door would increase the retail prices of the new taxis. 
Another example of how the formulators of the original re-
capitalisation policy ignored the socio-economic environment of the 
policy was the stipulation that all the new vehicles should be fitted 
with space for commuters who use wheelchairs. Initial calculations 
by the Department of Trade and Industry suggested that the 
inclusion of a wheelchair might add approximately R15 000 to the 
retail price of each vehicle, making the vehicle unaffordable to taxi 
owners.13 
Another example of the government’s statist conduct in its formu-
lation of the recapitalisation policy and its ignorance of the socio-
                                      
13 The inclusion of space for a wheelchair and most probably a higher purchase 
price for the new taxis led to dissatisfaction among various role players in the 
minibus taxi industry. Santaco, for instance, responded by stating that they do 
sympathise with, and acknowledge the constitutional right of people suffering 
from physical disabilities, to be treated equally. “However, these rights must be 
balanced against the rights of [other] commuters to [pay] the lowest possible 
fare” (Santaco, 2004:3).  
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economic policy environment in which the policy occurs relates to 
the scrapping allowance of R50 000 payable to taxi owners in 
exchange for their old taxis. An alarming aspect of the scrapping 
allowance in the formulation of the TRP is that the amount was 
calculated even before the safety specifications for the new taxis 
were published in the Government Gazette.14 The government sim-
ply ignored the potential price increase of the new taxis due to the 
safety regulations and acted in a one-sided manner. This conclusion 
can be based on the fact that the regulations were concluded only at 
the end of August 2005, while the scrapping allowance had already 
been finalised at the end of October 2004. At the time Top Six was 
indignant about the proposed R50 000 scrapping allowance to be 
awarded to taxi operators. Its former public relations officer, the late 
Rapodile (2005), voiced the association’s biggest concern as re-
gards the scrapping allowance: “How can you establish a scrapping 
allowance of R50 000 if you do not even know the expected retail 
price of the new taxis?”   
The last aspect stressing the government’s statist approach in its 
formulation of the recapitalisation policy relates to the government 
legitimising the policy by putting certain legal obligations on its target 
population. For example, taxi owners are required to obtain ope-
rating licences in order to operate in the industry and to qualify for 
the above-mentioned scrapping allowance. The policy is also univer-
sal as it is applicable to everyone within the minibus taxi industry. In 
addition, the government monopolises coercion to the recapitalisa-
tion policy by those within the industry because it is the sole in-
stitution that can lawfully indict those within the industry who do not 
comply with the policy. 
                                      
14 The new taxis are and should be fitted with seatbelts for all the passengers and 
a Type 2 Braking System, while operating on commercially rated tyres of a 
specific size (in this case the size is 185R or 195R). It should also have a metal 
weatherproof roof and at least one emergency exit. There are also quite a 
number of stipulations regarding the seats of the new taxis that relate, for 
example, to the height of the seat, the direction in which the seat should face, 
the fact that there should only be one passenger seat at the front, and so forth. 
In addition, the safety requirements stipulate that the new taxis should be white, 
have a yellow reflective side with rear markings, bearing the South African flag 
on both sides of the vehicle. In addition, the new taxis must have the applicable 
provincial coat of arms and route number on its front with the taxi owner’s 
details on the side (SADT, 2007:29). 
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6. Conclusions 
This article was devoted to an overview of the formulation process of 
the taxi recapitalisation policy. The aim was to highlight how the 
government acted in a statist manner in its formulation of the policy 
because it directed the course of the formulation process by assem-
bling its elites to formulate the recapitalisation policy in accordance 
with its interests – thus a top-down approach without adequate con-
sultation. Institutional statism was helpful in revealing that the formu-
lation of the recapitalisation policy is the product of (and revolved 
around) the government and its policy institutions with little opportu-
nity for the role players (i.e. the taxi industry) to buy into the for-
mulation of the policy. This then also explains why the industry has 
not willingly complied with the policy, since it has been excluded 
from the process. 
In addition to all the flaws mentioned in the formulation of the recapi-
talisation policy, two overriding problems have become evident in 
the formulation of the policy: firstly, the lack of mutual agreement 
between the government and the minibus taxi industry on what the 
problem in the industry really is. The government identified a num-
ber of problems, including the violence in the industry, the number of 
minibus taxis involved in accidents, and the large number of un-
roadworthy vehicles that presumably exacerbate the accident rate. 
The industry, on the other hand, merely regarded the occurrence of 
violence as a problem. As have been emphasised, clarity on what 
the problem is, is important since this determines the actions that 
need to be taken to address the issue(s) (i.e. the policy to be intro-
duced). The implication of this lack of mutual agreement in iden-
tifying the problem is that it is unlikely that the measures the govern-
ment takes to address the problem (from its perspective) will be 
supported by the minibus taxi industry. Furthermore, the government 
will have problems in implementing such a policy. Without mutual 
recognition of the policyproblem, the recapitalisation policy was 
bound to face problems from its inception. 
A second important problem with the recapitalisation policy is the 
fact that it has been formulated in a one-sided manner – thus, a very 
statist approach has been followed. The government did not offer a 
platform for public participation through public hearings or any other 
form of interaction with the most important role players such as the 
taxi-owners, taxi associations or the trade unions. Both the original 
and revised versions of the recapitalisation policy were drawn up 
without the participation and input of these role players in the 
industry. Had the government consulted these role players, it would 
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have been made aware of the unviability of its policy and alter-
natives to its proposed measures could have emerged, and these 
could have been debated. 
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